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SENTENCING IN GERMANY: 
EXPLAINING LONG-TERM STABILITY  
IN THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL 
SANCTIONS AND SENTENCING 
HANS-JÖRG ALBRECHT* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last decades, much has been written on significant changes in the use 
of prison sentences and imprisonment. These changes are assumed to reflect 
growing punitiveness and a rapidly spreading demand for public protection 
through long periods of confinement. In particular, the heavy inflation of the 
U.S. prison population has triggered scholarly attempts to explain an apparently 
insatiable appetite for imprisonment.1 Only marginal attention has been paid to 
the question of why consistency in sentencing, stability in sentencing outcomes, 
and a modest use of imprisonment can be observed in certain countries more 
than in others. For example, remarkable stability in the structure of criminal 
sanctions has been on display in Germany since the end of the 1960s, when a 
major law amendment gave priority to fines and significantly restricted the use 
of prison sentences. Since the end of the 1960s, now a period of four decades, 
four out of five criminal sanctions imposed by German criminal courts are day 
fines.2 Although some variation in rates of imprisonment can be observed over 
the last forty years in Germany, upward and downward swings have been 
limited. Criminal court statistics also show that the bulk of criminal sentences 
fall in the lower third of the range of sentences carried by criminal offense 
statutes. In spite of a statutory framework of sentencing that does not provide 
effective guidance for judges, consistency and stability are evidently achieved 
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 1.  NILS CHRISTIE, CRIME CONTROL AS INDUSTRY: TOWARDS GULAGS, WESTERN STYLE (3d 
ed. 2000); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); LOIS WACQUANT, PUNIR LES PAUVRES: LE NOUVEAU 
GOUVERNEMENT DE L’INSECURITE SOCIALE (2004). 
 2.  A day fine (also called unit fine) refers to a three-step procedure of determining a fine. In the 
first step, the number of day fines (units) is fixed. The number of day fines shall reflect the seriousness 
of the crime. In the second step, the size of a day fine is determined on the basis of the daily net income 
of the defendant. In the third step, the size of the fine is calculated by multiplying the number of day 
fines by the size of the day fine. Thus, day fines, unlike fixed-sum fines, may be adjusted to the individual 
financial circumstances of the offender and will satisfy the need for equal punishment. 
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through channels other than authoritative sentencing guidelines. At first glance, 
it seems that significant restraints are at work in the sentencing process that 
prevent the use of protracted prison sentences as a punitive and deterrent 
response, and those restraints are unaffected by the rhetoric of German 
politicians—like that of their peers elsewhere—in favor of punitive responses to 
crime.3 
A first clue in the analysis of what might serve as a restraint can be found in 
discourses originating in German politics about broadening the range of 
preventive detention (Sicherungsverwahrung) as a response to dangerous 
offenders.4 Germany was on trial before the European Court of Human Rights 
on several occasions over the last two years, facing allegations of violations of 
Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights due to the 
introduction of a retroactive security measure allowing indeterminate (and 
possibly lifelong) preventive detention for offenders deemed dangerous 
(particularly violent and sexual offenders).5 In the court hearings, the German 
Federal Ministry of Justice presented an interesting argument to the European 
Court. The Ministry of Justice lawyers argued that this type of security measure 
(preventive detention for dangerous habitual offenders) was contributing to the 
relatively low imprisonment rate observed in Germany.6 Elaborating along this 
line of reasoning, Winfried Hassemer has argued that the advances in 
sentencing doctrine and sentencing theory—as well as corresponding standards 
of reasoning, transparency, and accountability imposed on trial courts by 
appellate courts and the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof)—have 
resulted in concentrating the political pursuit of security on this “second track” 
of criminal sanctions focused on preventive detention instead of personal guilt.7 
In fact, imprisonment rates have been on the decline in Germany for at least a 
decade, and in some German states this decline is so marked that prison 
capacity has had to be reduced significantly. The General Accounting Office of 
the State of Hamburg recently advised the state government to respond to the 
dramatic decline in the Hamburg prison population by adjusting the prison 
budget and reducing the prison capacity accordingly.8 
 
 3.  Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Bestrafung der Armen? Zu Zusammenhängen zwischen Armut, 
Kriminalität und Strafrechtsstaat, in GERECHTE AUSGRENZUNG? WOHLFAHRTSPRODUKTION UND 
DIE NEUE LUST AM STRAFEN 111 (Bernd Dollinger & Henning Schmidt-Semisch eds., 2011). 
 4.  For particulars, see infra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
 5.  Haidn v. Germany, App. No. 6587/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011); M. v. Germany, App. No. 
19359/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2010). 
 6.  Heinz Schöch, Sicherungsverwahrung und Europäische Konvention zum Schutze der 
Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, in STRAFRECHT ALS SCIENTIA UNIVERSALIS; FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 
CLAUS ROXIN ZUM 80 GEBURTSTAG AM 15 1193, 1203 (2011). 
 7.  Winfried Hassemer, Sicherheit durch Strafrecht, 7 HRRS-STRAFRECHT 130, 141 (2006). 
 8.  3,120 prisoners in 2003; 2,030 in 2008; and 1,720 in 2011. See JANN MEYER-ABICH ET AL., 
JAHRESBERICHT 2009 ÜBER DIE PRÜFUNG DER HAUSHALTS- UND WIRTSCHAFTSFÜHRUNG DER 
FREIEGIN UND HANSESTADT HAMBURG MIT BEMERKUNGEN ZUR HAUSHALTSRECHNUNG 2007, at 
156 (Rechnungshof der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg 2009). 
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The argument brought forward in favor of preventive detention is based on 
a logic of guilt-dependent criminal punishment, restricting not only the 
imposition of a criminal sentence, but also the length of a prison sentence. A 
system of sentencing strictly guided and limited by individual guilt—according 
to this logic—prevents inflation of prison sentences by sidelining incapacitation 
and the pursuit of security in the decision-making on criminal punishment in the 
courts. With a separate track of measures of rehabilitation and security, the 
German system of criminal sanctions provides for a narrow safety valve that 
very selectively responds to political and public pressure for security and 
deterrence. 
II 
AN OUTLINE OF SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN GERMANY 
Germany has adopted a two-track system of criminal sanctions: one track 
for criminal punishment (which requires a finding of guilt and the 
determination of a fine or a prison sentence) and another providing for so-
called measures for rehabilitation and protection of public security.9 These 
second-track measures do not depend on personal responsibility; they are not 
considered to carry blame. Instead, they are the consequence of a finding of 
dangerousness (based on assessments of risks presented to the court by forensic 
psychologists or psychiatrists) and a corresponding need for treatment or 
preventive detention. This two-track approach is based on the belief that 
proportional punishment limited by the principle of personal guilt may not be 
sufficient to respond effectively (in terms of public protection) to habitual 
offenders or offenders suffering from mental diseases or addictions to alcohol 
or drugs who are likely to recidivate. German criminal law (as well the criminal 
law of other continental European countries, such as Denmark, Austria, and 
Switzerland) therefore provides for a line of criminal sanctions that pursues 
prevention of serious recidivism alone. Measures of treatment and security 
address three groups of criminal offenders deemed to be particularly at risk of 
serious recidivism: the mentally ill, the addicted, and the habitual offender.10 
These groups figured prominently as early as in nineteenth century conceptions 
of crime and punishment.11 In Germany, preventive detention 
(Sicherungsverwahrung) may be imposed in place of a prison sentence of two 
years or more if—besides some formal conditions referring to prior 
convictions—the status of a habitual felon and dangerousness are established.12 
Starting in 1998, a series of criminal law amendments driven by political 
 
 9.  Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Security Gaps: Responding to Dangerous Sex Offenders in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 200, 200 (2004). 
 10.  HEINZ KAMMEIER, MAßREGELRECHT (1995). 
 11.  DEVIANCE ET SOCIETE, RISQUE, DANGEROSITE ET SECURITE: RENAISSANCE ET 
MUTATIONS DE LA DEFENSE SOCIALE 34 (Christian N. Robert & Michel van de Kerchove eds., 2010). 
 12.  STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT 
[BGBL. I] 3322, § 66. 
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concerns about dangerous sexual offenders widened the legal scope of the 
preventive sentence significantly,13 making it applicable retroactively and 
providing for the possibility of its imposition after a prison sentence has been 
served. Retroactive application and post-enforcement sentence imposition 
ultimately brought Germany before the European Court of Human Rights 
(after the Federal Constitutional Court had turned down challenges by 
detainees on the ground that the prohibition of retroactivity would apply to 
criminal punishment only).14 
The system of sentencing and criminal sanctions implemented in Germany 
includes substantive and procedural elements.15 The substantive elements are 
found in the criminal penalties provided in the criminal code as well as their 
minimum and maximum ranges, criminal offense statutes carrying each a 
minimum and maximum penalty, and statutory prescriptions as regards the 
choice between different criminal sanctions such as day fines and prison 
sentences. The basic rule on sentencing mentions personal guilt as the decisive 
factor in determining the sentence, but concedes that the impact of the sentence 
on the offender should be taken into account.16 Moreover, a non-exhaustive list 
of offense and offender-related elements must be considered when it comes to 
determining the sentence.17 Beyond that, the sentencing rule says only that 
characteristics that establish a criminal offense may not be used to justify a 
particular sentence.18 The code gives explicit consideration to the victim and 
victim–offender reconciliation, allowing for mitigation in cases of seriously 
attempted or completely achieved reconciliation.19 Recently, a crown-witness 
provision was introduced that provides for a sentencing discount, too.20 
Particular rules address sentencing of multiple offenses;21 they demand a 
cumulative sentence (separate and consecutively enforceable sentences may not 
be imposed) and result in mandatory sentencing discounts.22 In cases of 
statutorily defined mitigating circumstances (most importantly, diminished 
responsibility, participation in the form of aiding and abetting, and attempt), 
minimum penalties are lowered significantly.23 A mandatory and general 
 
 13.  For a summary of reforms, see Jörg Kinzig, Die Neuordnung des Rechts der 
Sicherungsverwahrung, 4 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 177 (2011). 
 14.  Grischa Merkel, Case Note, Retrospective Preventive Detention in Germany: A Comment on 
the ECHR Decision Haidn v. Germany of 13 January 2011, 12 GERMAN L.J. 968 (2011). 
 15.  Hans-Jörg Albrecht, SIMPLIFICATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SETTLEMENTS OUT OF 
COURT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, 20–23 (2001); Hans-
Jörg Albrecht, Sentencing and Punishment in Germany, in PENAL REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 
139 (Michael Tonry ed., 2001). 
 16.  STGB, Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3322, § 46. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. § 46a. 
 20.  Id. § 46b. 
 21.  Id. §§ 52–55. 
 22.  Id. § 54. 
 23.  Id. § 49. 
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statutory minimum for recidivists was abolished in 1986 (the minimum had 
previously been raised to six months but was considered to have no practical 
relevance), but recidivism as an aggravating factor was introduced specifically 
for sexual abuse offenders in a 2003 criminal law amendment.24 
The procedural elements affecting sentencing refer to simplified criminal 
proceedings that—if applied—severely restrict the range of penalties available 
(day fines and suspended prison sentences up to one year may be imposed),25 
and to the recently introduced formal rules on sentence bargaining; further 
procedural elements concern the duty to give detailed reasons in writing26 and 
the rules that allow for a review of sentencing decisions by the High Court or 
Federal Court of Justice. The duty to give detailed reasons in writing is 
suspended if both prosecutor and defense waive the right to appeal, resulting in 
the verdict becoming immediately final.27 
The German system of criminal sanction is simple and provides for only two 
penal sanctions: day fines and imprisonment. Day fines come with a minimum 
of five-day fines and a maximum of 360-day fines; prison sentences in general 
may range from one month to fifteen years. The amount of a day fine unit 
(reflecting the net income of the defendant) may range from €1 to €30,000. Life 
imprisonment is almost exclusively restricted to murder, and the minimum 
period to be served before a lifer may be paroled is set at fifteen years. Prison 
sentences of up to two years may be suspended and conditions (fine, 
compensation, or community service) may be attached. The choice between a 
day fine and a short prison sentence (below six months) is strictly regulated 
(after a major law reform in 1969),28 giving priority to day fines and imposing a 
duty on courts to explain in writing why the priority rule should not apply. Most 
criminal offense statutes do not prescribe a minimum sentence but define the 
maximum penalty only. For offenses considered the most serious, minimum 
penalties are statutorily defined, and the most common minimum penalty is 
one-year imprisonment. However, for selected serious crimes (in particular, 
aggravated robbery, rape, drug trafficking, and homicide) the minimum is 
raised to two, three, or five years, and, in exceptional cases, to ten years. But 
such increased minimums regularly come with a provision that reopens the 
minimum and provides for a lesser minimum in cases of crimes of “less 
seriousness” (“minder schwere Fälle”). In almost all of these cases, reduced 
minimums result in the possibility of suspending a prison sentence. A full 
criminal trial can be circumvented by resorting to simplified procedures and the 
 
 24.  Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Sexualstrafrecht—Reformen und Ergebnisse, 59 RECHT DER JUGEND 
UND DES BILDUNGSWESENS 148, 154 (2011). 
 25.  STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], Apr. 7, 1987, BGBL. I 
at 1074, § 407. 
 26.  Id. § 267. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  ERSTES GESETZ ZUR REFORM DES STRAFRECHTS (STRRG) [FIRST LAW AMENDING 
CRIMINAL LAW], June 25, 1969, BGBL. I at 645. 
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imposition of a penal order (Strafbefehl). A so-called penal order does not 
require a trial, but restricts the sentence imposed in the penal order to a day 
fine or a suspended sentence of imprisonment of a maximum of one year.29 
Summarizing some of the characteristics of the German system of 
sentencing and sanctions that follow simply from substantive and procedural 
rules and that are of relevance for the analysis of stability, we find: 
(a) No effective statutory and mandatory minimums, 
(b) Strict obligations to justify sentencing in detail and in writing, 
(c) Incentives to resort to lower penalty ranges with provisions for 
(i) Simplified proceedings, and 
(ii) Reduced obligations to give reasons for sentencing, 
(d) Strict limitation of prison sentences to a fifteen-year maximum, 
(e) Multiple-offense sentencing statutes preventing separately enforceable sentences, 
and 
(f) A two-track system of criminal sanctions that separates preventive and retributive 
functions. 
III 
CRIME, SENTENCING, AND STABILITY: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
Over the last two decades, prisoner rates have increased significantly in 
many European countries, and particularly in North America. When looking at 
comparative prisoner rates in 2010 and 2011, Germany places in the bottom half 
of European countries. When looking at the course of imprisonment rates from 
various countries, Germany turns out to differ from a group of countries that 
have exhibited, during the last two decades, extreme movements in prisoner 
rates. The Netherlands, Spain, France, and especially England–Wales 
experienced a long-term increase in imprisonment rates from the 1980s 
forward.30 This rate increase resulted, for example, in a quadrupling of the 
prison population in the Netherlands and unprecedented prisoner rates in 
England–Wales and Spain.31 On the other hand, the Dutch prisons over the last 
six years have been rapidly emptied, which resulted in the closing of prisons.32 
Other countries exhibited further growth (particularly France after President 
Sarkozy put an end to the regular implementation of amnesties).33 
Michael Tonry has raised the question why—despite facing the same crime 
problems and displaying the same punitive discourses in the political arena—
 
 29.  Hans-Jörg Albrecht, SIMPLIFICATION OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SETTLEMENTS OUT OF 
COURT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS, 13–14 (2001). 
 30.  World Prison Brief: Europe, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, http://www.prisonstudies.org/ 
info/worldbrief/?search=europe&x=Europe (last visited Mar. 23, 2012), 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  ROB ALLEN, REDUCING THE USE OF IMPRISONMENT: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM 
EUROPE? 5 (2012). 
 33.  René Lévy, Pardons and Amnesties as Policy Instruments in Contemporary France, in CRIME, 
PUNISHMENT, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 551, 580–82 (Michael Tonry ed., 2007). 
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German penal policies were not harsher and imprisonment rates higher.34 From 
the course of German rates of imprisonment, on display in Graph 2, it seems 
clear that the crime rate is not strongly correlated with prisoner rates 
(exhibiting a Pearson correlation coefficient of -.054 in the observed data). 
Crime evidently does not explain punishment, at least not to a substantial 
extent and in its most serious form of imprisonment. In the 1960s and 1970s 
imprisonment rates declined while crime rates increased significantly. From the 
mid 1970s until the beginning of the 1980s a small window opens demonstrating 
a parallel increase of crime rates and prisoner rates. In the 1980s until the 
beginning of the 1990s imprisonment rates declined again while crime rates 
continued to climb. From the mid 1990s until today the imprisonment rate 
follows the crime rate in a remarkably stable and consistent way. Prisoner rates, 
therefore, are driven by policy, sentencing, or both. 
In contrast, England–Wales, the United States, Spain, and recently France 
display a reverse pattern. Rates of imprisonment moved up despite a long-term 
trend of declining crime rates35 (for the United States and England–Wales this is 
accounted for in both police statistics and crime surveys).36 Stable rates of 
  
Graph 1: Prisoner Rates in Europe and in the United States, 2010–2011 (Most Recent Figures).
37
 
 
 34.  Michael Tonry, Why Aren’t German Penal Policies Harsher and Imprisonment Rates Higher?, 
5 GERMAN L.J. 1187 (2004). 
 35.  THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010: STATE POPULATION DECLINES FOR 
THE FIRST TIME IN 38 YEARS (2010); ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (8th ed. 
2009). 
 36.  JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL R. RAND, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: 
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2009 (Georgette Walsh & Jill Duncan eds., 2010); CRIME IN ENGLAND 
AND WALES 2010/11: FINDINGS FROM THE BRITISH CRIME SURVEY AND POLICE RECORDED CRIME 
(Rupert Chaplin et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009); INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, supra note 30. 
 37.  Source: INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, supra note 30. 
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imprisonment are observed in most Scandinavian countries, with the exception 
of Finland where rates of imprisonment declined significantly during the 1990s.38 
The course of imprisonment rates in Germany sometimes follows the course 
of crime rates, but also consistently responds to criminal law reforms that 
restrict imprisonment or offer alternatives to imprisonment. The drop in the 
number of prisoners in the second half of the 1960s was caused by the 
introduction of a rule giving priority to day fines and requiring detailed 
reasoning when courts resort to short-term prison sentences.39 The drop 
occurring in the 1980s reflects the impact of a criminal law amendment lowering 
the legal requirements to suspend a prison sentence.40 
International comparative research on criminal sanctions and sentencing is 
still in its infancy. Research so far has dealt with various approaches to explain 
increases (and, to a lesser extent, decreases) in prison populations. Increases in 
prisoner rates are commonly linked to a growth in the demand for punishment. 
Public opinion has been perceived as crucial in understanding the increase in 
prison populations in some countries.41 However, it is evident that the course of  
 
Graph 2: Rates of Imprisonment and Crime in Germany 1961 Through 2010.
42
 
 
 38.  Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Reducing the Prison Population: Long-Term Experiences from Finland, 
in CRIME POLICY IN EUROPE 139, 148–49 (Council of Europe ed., 2004). 
 39.  STGB, Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3322, § 47. 
 40.  23. STRAFRECHTSÄNDERUNGSGESETZ [CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT], Apr. 13, 1986, 
BGBL. I at 393. 
 41.  Arie Freiberg & Karen Gelb, Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy, in 
PENAL POPULISM, SENTENCING COUNCILS AND SENTENCING POLICY 1, 3 (Arie Freiberg & Karen 
Gelb eds., 2008). 
 42.  Sources: Bundeskriminalamt: Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 1961–2010. Wiesbaden 1962–2011; 
Statistisches Bundesamt: Strafvollzug 1961–2010. Wiesbaden 1962–2011. 
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imprisonment and the trends in the size of prison populations do not follow a 
common set of variables or conditions. Developments in prison populations are 
diverse and reflect—as Tonry and Farrington recently observed—idiosyncrasies 
that necessitate careful analysis of individual national systems of sanctions and 
criminal justice.43 
Political will as to what role prison sentences should play in a system of 
criminal sanctions and how they should be enforced certainly holds a central 
place in explanations of the differences in prison populations. A major impact 
on the size of prison populations can be expected from deliberate political 
decisions to cut down the use of imprisonment. Examples can be drawn from 
decisions made by Austrian and German parliaments to reduce the use of short-
term prison sentences (up to six months) in the 1960s.44 Finland opted also for a 
major change in the use of prison sentences when making a decision to adopt 
practices implemented in other Scandinavian countries.45 Both examples, the 
German–Austrian as well as the Finnish, also demonstrate what is needed to 
initiate political discourses and ultimately political changes that reduce the 
prison population effectively: a justificatory system or a narrative that is 
politically acceptable, that endorses decarceration policies or alternatives to 
imprisonment, and that is embraced by the legal professions to whom the 
implementation of crime policies is entrusted.46 The narrative drawn from the 
program of Franz von Liszt47 was very successful when Germany and Austria 
implemented a criminal policy that gave priority to fines and drastically cut 
back short prison sentences in the 1960s. In Finland, it was evidently the desire 
to fall in line with the rest of the Scandinavian countries that resulted in 
adopting a decarceration policy that decreased the prison population 
significantly.48 
However, it is not clear how such narratives are put to work effectively and, 
in particular, how they achieve insertion into the collective conscience and 
value system of the judiciary and other legal professions. 
The Finnish case shows that discourses on the role of prison sentences and 
the size of the prison population may be initiated by placing national prison 
figures and sentencing practices into a comparative perspective.49 In the 1990s in 
 
 43.  Michael Tonry & David P. Farrington, Punishment and Crime Across Space and Time, in 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN COUNTRIES, 1980–1999, at 1 (Michael Tonry & David P. 
Farrington eds., 2005). 
 44.  HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK & GERHARDT GREBING, DIE GELDSTRAFE IM DEUTSCHEN 
UND AUSLÄNDISCHEN RECHT 39, 663–664 (1978). 
 45.  Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 37. 
 46.  James B. Jacobs, Finding Alternatives to the Carceral State, 74 SOC. RES. 695 (2007). 
 47.  Franz von Liszt, Der Zweckgedanke im Strafrecht, 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE GESAMTE 
STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 33 (1883) (arguing that imprisonment without long-term rehabilitative 
efforts would particularly make first-time offenders worse, and therefore criminal punishment in the 
lower scales of seriousness should not exceed a fine). 
 48.  Hanns von Hofer, Tapio Lappi-Seppälä & Lars Westfelt, NORDIC CRIMINAL STATISTICS 
1950–2010, at 16 (8th ed. 2012); Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 37. 
 49.  Tapio Lappi-Seppälä, Penal Policy in Scandinavia, 36 CRIME & JUST. 217, 233-44 (2007). 
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Australia, the question was raised why New South Wales would experience a 
much higher prisoner rate than the demographically similar state of Victoria.50 
The research suggested a mix of causes. In New South Wales, more 
imprisonment for fine default, longer prison sentences, and a higher rate of 
custodial sentences can be observed; whereas Victoria makes use of an 
additional alternative, periodic detention. Such comparisons seem to become 
effective within clusters of countries (or political entities) that are, due to 
various reasons, close to each other. However, comparisons may also result in 
discourses that point towards sentence enhancements and increases in the size 
of the prison population. At the occasion of the publication of English prison 
figures in 2005, the Chairman of a Northern Irish political party expressed 
surprise when he noticed that Northern Ireland had prison population figures of 
half of those documented for England–Wales.51 Referring to pressing issues of 
violence and security, it was then stated that the public would not understand 
that Northern Ireland resorts very rarely to imprisonment. 
The questions to be answered now concern, first, how stability in sentencing 
outcomes can be demonstrated other than by the rather crude measures of 
imprisonment rates, and, second, what explains stability in basic patterns of 
sentencing, if stability can be observed. 
IV 
MEASURES OF STABILITY IN SENTENCING 
Stability of sentencing can be observed when looking at the course of the 
structure of criminal sanctions. In this respect, Germany displays a remarkably 
stable pattern. Between 1970 and 2010, the structure of criminal penalties 
evidently did not change at all. In 1970, after a political decision to give priority 
to fines, fines accounted for more than 80% of criminal penalties—the same 
proportion that can be found in 2010. In between, minor fluctuations reflect 
“white noise” only.52 
When considering developments in the second track (measures of 
rehabilitation and security), we find a long-term decline in the number of 
offenders sentenced to incapacitating preventive detention. This trend was 
reversed in the mid-1990s, when dangerous-sexual-offender legislation widened 
the applicability of preventive detention.53 This development was stopped by a 
 
 50.  PATRICIA GALLAGHER, NEW SOUTH WALES BUREAU OF CRIME STATISTICS AND 
RESEARCH, WHY DOES NSW HAVE A HIGHER IMPRISONMENT RATE THAN VICTORIA? (1995). 
 51.  Surprise at Prison Population Figures, THE ALLIANCE PARTY OF N. IR. (Sept. 11, 2005), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050926143117/http://www.allianceparty.org/news.asp?id=1576 (internet 
archive). 
 52.  WOLFGANG HEINZ, DAS STRAFRECHTLICHE SANKTIONENSYSTEM UND DIE 
SANKTIONIERUNGSPRAXIS IN DEUTSCHLAND 1882–2008, at 67 (2010). 
 53.  JÖRG KINZIG, DIE LEGALBEWÄHRUNG GEFÄHRLICHER RÜCKFALLTÄTER: ZUGLEICH EIN 
BEITRAG ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES RECHTS DER SICHERUNGSVERWAHRUNG (2010); Jörg Kinzig, Das 
Recht der Sicherungsverwahrung nach dem Urteil des EGMR in Sachen M. gegen Deutschland, 30 NEUE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT 233 (2010). 
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series of decisions of the European Court of Human Rights mentioned above54 
and ultimately by a landmark decision of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court55 declaring all second track provisions related to preventive detention 
(Sicherungsverwahrung) to be unconstitutional (due to violation of the 
principle of proportionality) and fixing a time limit of 2013 for the Federal 
Parliament to enact legislation in line with the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, 
German Constitution). However, the absolute number of offenders sentenced 
to preventive detention and confined after having served a prison sentence was 
always relatively small, amounting in the year 2010, for example, to 101 cases 
(preventive detainees never comprised more than 1% of the prison population 
at large).56 Such small numbers certainly will not affect the structure (and 
stability) significantly; the existence of such a group of detainees characterizes a 
penal system that exposes a few offenders to extreme (indeterminate and 
possibly lifelong) measures of security in exchange for routine sentence 
application in the first track of criminal sanctions. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Hassemer has interpreted the role of the second track as relieving 
the system of criminal penalties and sentencing from pressure to consider 
dangerousness and security when imposing criminal punishment. A system of 
punishment determined and restricted by personal guilt will be in all societies—
focused on risk and the management of risk—confronted with an enormous 
pressure to accept risk and the prevention of risk as a salient goal.57 With a two-
track system, risk management can be channeled to measures of security that 
follow a different logic of implementation. 
Another way of making stability in sentencing and sentencing outcomes 
visible concerns patterns in the length of imprisonment imposed and the course 
these patterns take. Four cases will be presented: burglary, aggravated robbery, 
rape, and homicide. These offenses were chosen because they represent varying 
degrees of policy choices as regards resorting to prison sentences due to 
different minimum sentences prescribed by the offense statutes. Although 
robbery, rape, and homicide offense statutes prescribe minimum penalties,58 
these statutes also include rules that lower the minimum penalty for “less 
 
 54.  See supra note 5. 
 55.  Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 22, 2009, 2 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 2365. 
 56.  STATISTISCHES BUNDESAMT, RECHTSPFLEGE—STRAFVERFOLGUNG 2010, 331 (2011). 
 57.  Hassemer, supra note 7, at 133. 
 58.  The minimum penalty for burglary is three months. STGB, Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3322,  
§ 243. The minimum penalty for rape is two years (until the end of the 1990s—in 1998, as a result of 
expanding the offense statute and including marital rape cases and sexual assault in general, the 
minimums were differentiated into one, two, three, and five year categories). Id. § 177. The aggravated-
robbery offense statute prescribed a minimum penalty of five years imprisonment (until the end of the 
1990s, then the minimum was split up into three years and five years attached to different sets of 
aggravating circumstances). Id. § 250. Murder carries life. Id. § 211. And voluntary homicide carries five 
years. Id. § 212. For rape, aggravated robbery, and homicide the minimums are statutorily downgraded 
for less-serious offenses (for rape, six months to one year, id. § 177(V), aggravated robbery one year, id. 
§ 250(III), and homicide one year, id. § 213). 
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serious cases” (of rape, robbery or homicide) to penalty ranges that allow for 
suspension of a prison sentence. A definition of less serious offenses is not 
provided by the law, but is left to the assessment of criminal courts, which on 
appeal is subject to review by the Federal Court of Justice.59 
Sentencing of burglary cases results—in the thirty-five year period covered 
in Graph 3—in a stable pattern of prison sentences (and day fines). There is 
evidence that an amendment mentioned above,60 which lifted particular 
restrictions placed on suspending prison sentences between one and two years, 
had a significant impact by increasing the rate of suspended prison sentences in 
burglary cases immediately from about 40% to approximately 60%. However, 
after this significant increase, the rate of suspended prison sentences tends to 
become stable again at around 60%. Moreover, the rate of day fines imposed 
for burglary offenses (a day fine may replace a prison sentence between three 
and six months) between 1976 and 2010 likewise does not reveal particular 
trends. The rate does not vary significantly from an average of about 25% 
during the period under observation. Most importantly, long prison sentences 
(over two years), despite a statutory maximum prison sentence of ten years, 
remain consistent and, over a period of thirty-five years, well under 10% of all  
sentences imposed for burglary. Although burglary and burglars in the 1960s 
  
Graph 3: Prison Sentence Length and Rates of Suspended Prison Sentences for Burglary, 1976–
2010 (%).
61
 
 
 59.  See Sönke Gerhold, Der unbenannte minder schwere Fall im Strafrecht und seine Bedeutung für 
die Strafzumessung, 2 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS JURISTISCHE STUDIUM 260 (2009). 
 60.  See supra note 39. 
 61.  Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt: Strafverfolgung 1976–2010. Wiesbaden 1977–2011. 
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were still convenient candidates for the second track and preventive detention 
due to the large share of recidivists, and in particular recidivists easily passing 
the formal thresholds of preventive detention (prior convictions and prior 
prison experience), property offenders moved out of preventive detention since 
the 1960s. This trend was initiated by court practice in the 1970s and 1980s and 
then acknowledged in recent amendments restricting imposition of preventive 
detention essentially to violent crimes.62 
Aggravated robbery carries a minimum prison sentence of five years (since 
the end of the 1990s, minimums of three and five years) and a statutory 
maximum of fifteen years. However, the offense statute reduces the minimum 
penalty to one year if a case of minor seriousness is established. 
Graph 4 shows that over a thirty-four year period, consistently around 70–
75% of sentences fall below the statutory minimum of five years (revised in 
1998). In the upper half of the regular sentencing range (ten to fifteen years), a 
stable trend prevails. Imprisonment of more than five years holds a constant 
level between 1976 and 2010. Changes are evidently confined to the area below 
the regular minimum penalty and to an exchange of penalties from above five 
years to prison sentences of between three and five years. A change, indicating 
a move towards imprisonment of between one and two years, is paralleled by an 
  
Graph 4: Prison Sentence Length and Rates of Suspended Prison Sentences for Aggravated 
Robbery, 1976–2010 (%).
63
 
 
 62.  JÖRG KINZIG, DIE LEGALBEWÄHRUNG GEFÄHRLICHER RÜCKFALLTÄTER: ZUGLEICH EIN 
BEITRAG ZUR ENTWICKLUNG DES RECHTS DER SICHERUNGSVERWAHRUNG (2010); JÖRG KINZIG, 
DIE SICHERUNGSVERWAHRUNG AUF DEM PRÜFSTAND: ERGEBNISSE EINER THEORETISCHEN UND 
EMPIRISCHEN BESTANDSAUFNAHME DES ZUSTANDES EINER MAßREGEL (1996). 
 63.  Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt: Strafverfolgung 1976–2010. Wiesbaden 1977–2011. 
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increase in suspended prison sentences. In robbery cases, the use of preventive 
detention remains stable; preventive detention is added to approximately 0.5% 
of aggravated robbery sentences. 
The time series accounting for sentences for rape offenses offers an 
opportunity not only to look at stability but also at possible effects of a major 
revision of the rape statute in 1998.64 This amendment—which went into force in 
1998—followed public outrage about sexual murders of children by sexual 
offenders released on forensic assessments of having a low risk of re-offending.65 
As indicated above, the minimum penalties were differentiated and raised 
according to various aggravating circumstances.66 Moreover, restrictions on the 
security measure of preventive detention have been eased. The amendment 
went beyond the provision of enhancement of punishment and easing 
preventive detention. The amendment responded also to other policy issues, 
including marital rape as well as same-gender rape. 
When looking at sentencing patterns unfolding between 1995 and 2010 in 
rape cases, two trends can be observed: an increase in prison sentences of one 
to two years and a parallel increase in the rate of suspended prison sentences. 
 
Graph 5: Prison Sentence Length and Rates of Suspended Prison Sentences for Rape, 1995–2010 
(%).
67
 
 
 64.  GESETZ ZUR BEKÄMPFUNG VON SEXUALDELIKTEN UND ANDEREN GEFÄHRLICHEN 
STRAFTATEN [LAW ON COMBATING SEXUAL CRIME AND OTHER DANGEROUS CRIMINAL 
OFFENSES], Jan. 26, 1998, BGBL. I at 160. 
 65.  Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Die Determinanten der Sexualstrafrechtsreform, 111 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 863 (1999). 
 66.  See supra note 58. 
 67.  Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt: Strafverfolgung 1995–2010. Wiesbaden 1996–2011. 
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The increase in the one to two years category slightly affects other categories of 
prison sentences. 
 From police statistics it is known that during the last twenty years, and 
evidently influenced by the law reform of 1998, patterns of victim–offender 
relationships in rape cases known to the police changed.68 Although the number 
of stranger rapes reported to police declined, the number of rapes in close 
partnerships increased. From that it may tentatively be concluded that the 
changes in the one to two years category and the increase in suspended 
sentences reflect a change in the structure of rape cases brought to criminal 
courts. It may be assumed that marital rape cases attract more prison sentences 
out of the one to two years category, which in turn will also be more likely to be 
suspended (an assumption that is plausible on the basis of what is known about 
the effect of the victim–offender relationship on sentencing).69 Trends in other 
sentence categories display stability. A look at the imposition of preventive 
detention during this period reveals a slight increase in absolute numbers 
(before 1998 preventive detention is imposed on average in eleven cases per 
year; in the period after 1998 some twenty-one cases are counted per year). 
 
Graph 6: Long Prison Sentences and Preventive Detention in Rape Cases.
70
 
 
 68.  PKS-Zeitreihen 1987 bis 2011 (Jan. 19, 2013), http://www.bka.de/nn_193232/DE/Publikationen/ 
PolizeilicheKriminalstatistik/PksZeitreihen/pksZeitreihen__node.html?__nnn=true. 
 69.  HANS-JÖRG ALBRECHT, STRAFZUMESSUNG BEI SCHWERER KRIMINALITÄT; EINE 
VERGLEICHENDE THEORETISCHE UND EMPIRISCHE STUDIE ZUR HERTSTELLUNG UND 
DARSTELLUNG DES STRAFMASSES (1994) [hereinafter ALBRECHT, STRAFZUMESSUNG BEI 
SCHWERER KRIMINALITÄT]; Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Sentencing and Disparity—A Comparative Study, 2 
EUR. J. ON CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 98 (1994) [hereinafter Albrecht, Sentencing and Disparity]. 
 70.  Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt: Strafverfolgung 1995–2010. Wiesbaden 1996–2011. 
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Criminal courts thus have responded to the amendment of 1998 as 
Hassemer has suggested.71 Criminal punishment after the reform was imposed 
in the same way and with the same results as was done before. The course of 
criminal punishment evidently does not reflect security concerns. This is in line 
with decisions of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) holding that 
incapacitation may not be invoked as grounds in sentencing since the second 
track of criminal sanctions provides for exclusive rules regarding security and 
protection of the public.72 
The safety valve of preventive detention on the second track was opened 
slightly to trap a few more sex offenders, but the punishment track remained 
stable—and with that the imposition of prison sentences on the basis of 
personal responsibility and guilt. 
Stability in sentencing is also visible in murder and homicide cases. Murder 
as defined in § 211 of the Criminal Code carries mandatory life imprisonment. 
However, decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court and the Federal Court 
of Justice—despite the explicit wording of the law—have opened the murder 
statute for prison sentences below life (basically with the argument that a 
  
Graph 7: Homicide and Murder Convictions, Life Sentences, and Prisoners Serving Life 
Sentences (N).
73
 
 
 71.  See Hassemer, supra note 7, at 133. 
 72.  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], 21 NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
STRAFRECHT [NStZ] 595, 2001. 
 73.  Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt: Reihe Strafverfolgung 1962–2010. Wiesbaden 1963–2011; 
Reihe Strafvollzug 1962–2010. Wiesbaden 1963–2011. 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
N
Murder convictions Homicide and Murder Convictions
Life Sentence Prisoners Serving Life
09_ALBRECHT_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2013  5:53 PM 
No. 1 2013] SENTENCING IN GERMANY 227 
81,015
3,783
1,937 1,952 1,671 1,304 143 45 4
0.00
10,000.00
20,000.00
30,000.00
40,000.00
50,000.00
60,000.00
70,000.00
80,000.00
90,000.00
Fine < 6
months
6
months
7–9    
months
10–12 
months
1–2      
years
2–3      
years
3–5    
Years
5–10    
Years
N
um
be
r o
f s
en
te
nc
es
mandatory criminal penalty does not comply with the need for individualization 
and the consideration of personal guilt).74 
In fact, murder convictions during the last fifty years never generated a 
corresponding number of life prison sentences. Courts obviously found ways to 
circumvent the mandatory penalty long before the Federal Constitutional Court 
held that a murder conviction need not always result in life imprisonment.75 
From the conviction and sentencing data as well as data on offenders serving 
life sentences, it may be concluded that despite long-term flat lines in murder 
convictions and life sentences, the number of prisoners serving life sentences 
doubled between the early 1980s and 2010. The only explanation here may be 
found in life prisoners serving longer terms and post-sentencing decisions that 
delay release from life imprisonment. 
A last approach to sentencing stability concerns a look at the reversed J-
curve distribution of sentencing outcomes. The reversed J-curve distribution 
comes in two forms and evidently can be traced back to the beginning of the 
twentieth century. For the first decades of the twentieth century, Franz Exner 
pointed out that criminal sentences were not normally distributed over the 
penalty range prescribed in a criminal offense statute but—in those cases for 
which data back then were accessible—come in the form of a reversed J- 
 
Graph 8: Sentencing Fraud—Distribution of Criminal Sentences, 2010.
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 74.  Tatjana Hörnle, Strafzumessungslehre im Lichte des Grundgesetzes, DAS STRAFENDE GESETZ 
IM SOZIALEN RECHTSSTAAT 105 (Eva Schumann ed., 2010). 
 75.  See KLAUS SESSAR, RECHTLICHE UND SOZIALE PROZESSE EINER DEFINITION DER 
TÖTUNGSKRIMINALITÄT 186–87 (1981) (outlining judicial strategies which avoid the imposition of a 
life sentence). 
 76.  Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Reihe Strafverfolgung 2010. Wiesbaden 2011. 
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distribution, placing the bulk of penalties close to the minimum prescribed by a 
criminal offense statute.77 
Sentencing of fraud cases results in an extreme reversed J-distribution. The 
fraud offense statute carries a penalty range of a minimum of a day fine and a 
maximum of ten years’ imprisonment. Data on display in Graph 8 shows that 
sentences above two years are extremely rare and that the bulk of sentences are 
concentrated on penalties below six months and on day fines. Virtually all 
criminal offenses with a maximum of five years (or lower) and no minimum 
display this distribution. 
Another type of reversed J-distribution becomes apparent in cases with an 
elevated minimum penalty. Here, the distribution charts sentences below the 
minimum in cases when courts resort to the reduced sentence made available 
through provisions exempting less serious offenses from the mandatory 
minimums. 
Section 29a I, No. 2 of the Narcotics Law provides for a minimum of one-
year imprisonment and a maximum of the general maximum (fifteen years) for 
drug trafficking (including production, trafficking, and possession of significant 
amounts of controlled drugs).78 In cases of minor seriousness, the minimum is 
reduced to three months. The distribution of sentences approaches a normal 
distribution (when considering day fines as the legal minimum). However, the 
  
Graph 9: Distribution of Criminal Sentences for Drug Trafficking (Significant Amounts of 
Drugs).
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 77.  FRANZ EXNER, STUDIEN ÜBER DIE STRAFZUMESSUNGSPRAXIS DER DEUTSCHEN GERICHTE 
75–85 (1931). 
 78.  GESETZ ÜBER DEN VERKEHR MIT BETÄUBUNGSMITTELN [LAW ON THE MARKETING OF 
DRUGS], July 28, 1981, BETÄUBUNGSMITTELGESETZ [BTMG]. 
 79.  Source: Statistisches Bundesamt: Reihe Strafverfolgung 2010. Wiesbaden 2011. 
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left side of the distribution exhibits exemptions from the regular range of 
penalties that start at the one- to two-years category. From this point on, the 
reversed J-curve takes effect, demonstrating the concentration of sentences at 
the bottom of the penalty range. 
Summarizing sentencing patterns for Germany, it can be concluded that 
criminal punishment demonstrates significant stability over the last four 
decades. The structure of criminal sanctions and measures of sentence length 
also exhibit immediate responsiveness to criminal law amendments that 
established priority over fines at the end of the 1960s and expanded suspension 
of prison sentences in the 1980s. Responsiveness to law reform addressing the 
choice between fines, prison sentences, suspended prison sentences, and 
immediate imprisonment may be explained by a reversed J-distribution of 
criminal sentences that places the bulk of criminal sentences in penalty ranges 
that are open to these choices. The provision of less-serious offense statutes 
allowing deviation from elevated minimum penalties opens a road back to the 
choice between day fines and prison sentences, or suspended and immediate 
imprisonment. The question of stability of sentencing therefore moves away 
from sentence length and towards the choice between intermediate (or 
community) penalties and imprisonment. The second track of sanctions, a 
major issue of law reforms aiming at protection of the public in the 1990s and in 
the new millennium, does not affect structure and stability of criminal 
punishment, but serves evidently as a safety valve that exposes few offenders (a 
negligible number in terms of structure and structural impact) assessed to be 
dangerous in rather complex and complicated proceedings to indeterminate 
confinement. Although a direct test of the “safety valve” hypothesis is not 
possible, the time series of criminal punishment and preventive detention 
provide for significant empirical support of a theoretically plausible mechanism 
exerting restraint on resorting to long prison sentences. 
 
V 
WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR STABILITY IN SENTENCING? 
Explanations of the course of criminal sentencing on the basis of 
comparative approaches have been sought over the last decade in the political 
and social framework within which sentencing is implemented and in the 
constitutional arrangements that define the relationship between the judiciary, 
the public, and the political system.80 Explanations have been sought in 
differences in the welfare orientation expressed in penal systems.81 In fact, 
retention of welfare policies seems to be correlated with vertical trust (trust in 
state institutions), less punitive attitudes of the public, and, ultimately, less use 
 
 80.  See, e.g., MICHAEL CAVADINO & JAMES DIGNAN, PENAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH (2006). 
 81.  DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: A HISTORY OF PENAL STRATEGIES (1985); 
Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 49. 
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of imprisonment and more stable patterns of imprisonment.82 However, France, 
Greece, Belgium, and Spain have political agendas embracing the welfare state 
but display punitive patterns in the development of criminal penalties and 
prison populations. 
Thus, the extent of insulation of the judiciary from the political system has 
been proposed as an explanatory factor. Insulation of the judiciary and 
protection against political pressures to implement punitive policies may make 
transformation of punitive tendencies into sentencing practice more difficult 
and sustain stability. In particular, when considering that certain arrangements 
might be designed to “reflect public emotion” in sentencing,83 this assumption 
certainly has considerable credit when comparing the United States with 
continental European countries. But differences in such arrangements do not 
explain why judicial systems that are comparably insulated and designed to 
separate judicial and political arenas display completely different patterns of 
sentencing (and responses to punitive discourses and policies). Germany also 
seems to be different in another aspect of the political (and legislative) input 
into the system of sentencing. In Germany, there has not been a serious political 
attempt at raising minimum sentences in the last five decades without offering 
at the same time an escape ramp in the form of a “minor seriousness” category 
that then reopened the way back to lesser penalty ranges.84 
Insulation (and stability) might also be achieved through a professionalized 
body of judges, and a consolidated and imagined (but convincing) explanation 
of sentencing that gets entrenched in the legal profession, in particular in the 
judiciary. 
In fact, sentencing theory as developed by the judiciary and its essential 
elements confirmed in legal doctrine provided for an effective path to 
restricting sentencing discretion and creating commitment to sentencing 
standards among the judiciary. The judiciary has generated mechanisms that 
stabilize sentencing outcomes through a strong attachment to traditional and 
established sentencing tariffs. Sentencing research has confirmed that 
professional socialization of judges (and public prosecutors) includes learning 
patterns that feed almost exclusively on (1) sentencing information passed and 
communicated through informal channels (within the judiciary), (2) documents 
containing information on past sentences (prior records accessible for 
prosecutors and judges before the sentencing decision), and (3) trial 
arrangements that provide for sentencing proposals of the public prosecutor 
 
 82.  Helmut Hirtenlehner & Dina Hummelsheim, Schützt soziale Sicherheit vor 
Kriminalitätsfurcht? Eine empirische Untersuchung zum Einfluss wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Sicherungspolitik 
auf das kriminalitätsbezogene Sicherheitsbefinden, 94 MONATSSCHRIFT FÜR KRIMINOLOGIE UND 
STRAFRECHTSREFORM 178 (2011); Lappi-Seppälä, supra note 49, at 373–377. 
 83.  Tonry, supra note 34, at 1198. 
 84.  Cf. Michael Tonry, Criminology, Mandatory Minimums, and Public Policy, 5 CRIMINOLOGY 
& PUB. POL’Y 45, (2006) (describing American experiences with minimum sentences). 
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and defense council before the judicial decision is made.85 In addition, an 
effective system of self-control within the judiciary has been developed that 
reduces opportunities and incentives to deviate from established sentencing 
patterns. 
This system is simple but comes with an elaborate sentencing doctrine and 
complex reasoning that is based on rather restricted statutory guidance 
(available in § 46 of the Criminal Code,86 which emphasizes personal guilt as the 
decisive basis for sentencing and criminal punishment).87 However, elaborate 
normative reasoning and corresponding sentencing doctrine or theory neither 
explain mechanisms of sentencing guidance (or sentencing practices), nor can 
they account for stability in sentencing. They just reflect the difference between 
presenting (or reasoning about) a sentencing decision and the way a sentencing 
decision is made. 
Criminal law and doctrine do not provide for guidance and structure beyond 
the statement that personal guilt must be the basis of a sentencing decision. 
Individual guilt in this respect has two functions: it determines the imputation of 
criminal responsibility (rationale of punishment) and it determines the 
sentencing decision and the size of the penalty (limitation or restriction of 
punishment). The judiciary has developed a model of joining various functions 
of criminal punishment: 
(1) The limiting function of guilt does not allow deviation from criminal punishment 
commensurate with guilt.
88
 
(2) Deterrence and rehabilitative purposes may only be considered within a range of 
sentences that is commensurate with individual guilt. 
The sentencing theory of “margins” (Spielraumtheorie), as adopted by the 
German Court of Justice89 and widely supported by penal scholars, assumes that 
a single sentence length exists that corresponds exactly to individual guilt as 
expressed in the criminal offense.90 However, it is also assumed that it is not 
possible to determine this sentence with precision because of general limitations 
in decision-making under conditions of uncertainty and limited access to the 
truth. The discourse on this issue is neither theoretically interesting nor of any 
value for sentencing practice. The theory of margins simply says that a sentence 
corresponding to personal guilt may be chosen from a (narrow) range of 
sentences determined within the range of penalties carried by the offense 
statute. Minimum and maximum sentences of this narrow range must still be 
justified by guilt. Of course, such an assertion is tautological. If it is not possible 
 
 85.  Albrecht, Sentencing and Disparity, supra note 69. 
 86.  STGB, Nov. 13, 1998, BGBL. I at 3322, § 46. 
 87.  TATJANA HÖRNLE, TATPROPORTIONALE STRAFZUMESSUNG (1999); FRANZ STRENG, 
STRAFRECHTLICHE SANKTIONEN: DIE STRAFZUMESSUNG UND IHRE GRUNDLAGEN 215 (2002). 
 88.  BGH Apr. 10, 1987, 34 BGHST 345. 
 89.  BGH Nov. 10, 1954, 7 BGHST 29 (32); BGH Aug. 4, 1965, 20 BGHST  264 (267); BGH Oct. 
27, 1970, 24 BGHST 132 (133). 
 90.  BERND-DIETER MEIER, STRAFRECHTLICHE SANKTIONEN 115 (3d ed. 2009); STRENG, supra 
note 78, at 252. 
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to quantify the criminal penalty that would exactly correspond to personal guilt, 
why should it then be possible to quantify the lower and upper borders of a 
sentence still commensurate with guilt? Within this assumed range of guilt-
commensurate sentences, however, preventive functions of the penalty may be 
considered. Sentences falling within the range are considered to be legally 
acceptable penalties. The consequence of the theory of margins, therefore, is 
not the generation of an effective tool for determining the size of a criminal 
penalty, but the theory contributes to opening a normative discourse on which 
arguments should influence the limits of a guilt-commensurate criminal penalty. 
German doctrine and judicial decisions over the last forty years have generated 
an impressive amount of literature and judicial decisions as regards what factors 
may be used as aggravating or mitigating circumstances in sentencing decisions, 
how the aggravating or mitigating character must be determined, and under 
what conditions deterrence may influence the penalty.91 Normative discourses 
on sentencing center around the question of the relationship between personal 
guilt and positive general prevention, questions of proportionate sentencing and 
the range of admissible aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the weight to 
be attached to certain circumstances, and how such weight might be expressed. 
Likewise impressive is that these discourses—which are, as regards doctrinal 
depth and theoretical underpinning, unparalleled in this world—are completely 
unrelated to sentencing scales and penalty ranges. 
These discourses fail, however, to make a distinction between the 
presentation of a sentencing decision and the making of a criminal sentence. 
Making the sentence refers to the decision-making process that results in 
imposing a concrete criminal penalty. The sentencing decision then has to be 
presented in writing and elaborated on all relevant factors that have been 
considered in determining the penalty. Presentation and making the sentence 
have to be distinguished, particularly in legal systems where the criminal court 
is obliged to give detailed reasons in writing for a concrete penalty imposed. 
Presentation and making the sentence fulfill different functions. 
With respect to making a sentencing decision, most important are those 
rules that determine placement of an individual case on the applicable scale (or 
range) of penalties. The proposition that the range of penalties carried by an 
offense statute represents a scale that reflects seriousness of offenses is not 
contended. But the question of how a distribution curve should look has 
received only marginal attention. This question is certainly more important than 
reasoning about individual sentencing characteristics and how much influence 
should be attached to general deterrence within a guilt-commensurate penalty 
range (which, in fact, cannot be indicated in concrete cases). With the 
elaboration of the concept of the normal or typical case (Regelfall) the German 
Federal Court of Justice has presented an answer to that question. A “normal 
 
 91.  See, e.g., HANS-JÜRGEN BRUNS, STRAFZUMESSUNGSRECHT: GESAMTDARSTELLUNG (1974); 
MEIER, supra note 81; STRENG supra note 78. 
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case” shall represent the typical perpetration of a criminal offense.92 With this 
approach, a comparative and empirical view is adopted (an approach that poses 
the question, “What is typical, and which elements should be considered when 
establishing whether an offense falls into the category of a normal or typical 
criminal offense?”).93 The typical offense—and this is the decisive point—is 
placed within the lower third of the penalty range carried by the respective 
offense statute. The Federal Court of Justice assumes (and certainly is correct 
when considering mainstream assumptions on how seriousness of crime should 
be construed) that the typical criminal offense displays a low degree of 
seriousness that does not justify its placement in the middle of the sentencing 
range.94 In fact, the distribution of losses in cases of theft, burglary, fraud, or 
robbery, and the intensity of injuries in case of violent offenses, as well as other 
indicators, all display a concentration at the low end of scales measuring 
seriousness of crime. The comparative and empirical approach to the placement 
of criminal offenses within the sentencing range is in principle not compatible 
with the normative access to discussing guilt and personal responsibility, and 
vice versa. Although the latter approach—be it based on individualized 
assessments or proportionate thinking—is not capable of identifying a place in 
the range of sentences (and it is symptomatic for normative discourses not to 
refer to concrete cases or sentencing decisions), the comparative but also 
empirical approach is not capable of accounting for the myriad of arguments 
coming with individualized sentencing and possible expressions of personal 
guilt. This conflict cannot be resolved. It is also interesting to see that while 
penal doctrine does not seem to be satisfied with this approach,95 some penal 
scholars describe it as a matter of fact,96 but essentially request to individualize 
this step, too, although the alternative to the “typical case” standard of the 
Federal Court of Justice consists of giving cloudy hints to acts of appraisal, 
judicial experience, and judicial skill, which are then labeled as acts of extreme 
complexity.97 
However, the German normative framework of sentencing provides an 
opportunity to satisfy the obvious need to discuss all factors relevant for 
individualized sentencing and to achieve a decision that is carried primarily by 
those factors that establish the “typical case” (or establish deviations from it). 
Sentencing research dealing with the question of whether a criminal sentence 
can be predicted by the arguments used in writing (and justifying the sentencing 
decision) has revealed that a (small) part of the grounds introduced in the 
 
 92.  BGH Sept. 13, 1976, 27 BGHST 2. 
 93.  MATTHIAS MAURER, KOMPARATIVE STRAFZUMESSUNG: EIN BEITRAG ZUR 
FORTENTWICKLUNG DES SANKTIONENRECHTS (2005). 
 94.  BGH Jan. 13, 1983, 4 NSTZ 217 (1983); see also BERT GÖTTING, GESETZLICHE 
STRAFRAHMEN UND STRAFZUMESSUNGSPRAXIS. EINE EMPIRISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG ANHAND DER 
STRAFVERFOLGUNGSSTATISTIK FÜR DIE JAHRE 1987 BIS 1991 (1997). 
 95.  STRENG, supra note 78, at 305. 
 96.  MEIER, supra note 90, at 208. 
 97.  Hörnle, supra note 74, at 116. 
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sentencing decision in fact predicts the sentence, as do the same factors that 
have been established before the sentencing decision was made (essentially, 
losses, prior convictions, and extent of injuries). But most of the reasoning in 
sentencing decisions was linked to arguments that did not correlate with the 
sentencing outcomes.98 From that, it seems clear that, at least for systems that 
require detailed written explanations of sentencing decisions, such written 
accounts display a response to normative demands for complex decisions that in 
making a decision cannot be met, but in presenting a decision can perfectly be 
complied with. The normative discourses around the sentencing decision 
triggered in German penal sciences as in jurisprudence of appellate courts 
embrace individualization of the penalty as the centerpiece of criminal 
punishment theory. The most powerful idea of individualization follows from 
post-Enlightenment thinking that each human being should be considered 
unique and should be treated according to such uniqueness. Although the idea 
of individualization was adopted in sentencing the criminal offender, sentencing 
of administrative (or regulatory) offenses evidently was based on another 
concept. This concept provides for fixed tariffs—for example, in the case of 
motor vehicle offenses (speeding, red light violations, et cetera)99 when 
circumstances other than the offense itself are not taken into account. This 
system is based on the conviction that in certain situations persons (when 
offending) are to be treated solely on the basis of the role they play in these 
situations (for example the role of the motor vehicle driver). In the making of a 
criminal sentence, the administrative concept of tariffs evidently has been 
implemented. 
This system of generating at the same time complex legal reasoning and 
straightforward practical results (in terms of placing cases regularly at the 
bottom of sentencing ranges) is backed by an appellate and review system, 
which during the last decades has increasingly treated sentencing as a decision 
based on the application of law, rather than discretion. Thus, the German 
Federal Court of Justice could identify several areas along the decision-making 
process where mistakes in law may occur when deciding on a criminal 
sentence.100 First, the court identifies inconsistency in reasoning, which has 
obtained the status of a legal mistake, and which is directly related to the 
demand for complexity in reasoning about a criminal sentence.101 Second, 
flawed assessment of sentencing facts (either mitigating or aggravating) has 
received the court’s attention,102 as has, third, deviation from the “usual” penalty 
 
 98.  ALBRECHT, STRAFZUMESSUNG BEI SCHWERER KRIMINALITÄT, supra note 69, at 408. 
 99.  The Federal Ministry publishes a so-called Bußgeldkatalog [Catalogue of Administrative 
Fines], available at http://www.bmvbs.de/SharedDocs/DE/Artikel/StB-LA/bussgeldkatalog.html?nn= 
36008#9. This catalogue details tariffs for all administrative offenses. For example, speeding less than 
ten kilometers per hour above the limit within city limits incurs a €15 fine. 
 100.  STRENG, supra note 87, at 265. 
 101.  BGH Jan. 9, 1961, 17 BGHST 35. 
 102.  BGH Dec. 7, 1990, 1991, 10 NSTZ 231. 
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(or tariff) in sentencing.103 The latter argument is close to the concept of an error 
of law that is based on the finding that a sentence imposed by a trial court is 
“completely unjustifiable.” Then, the extent of reasons given in writing for a 
criminal sentence must match the seriousness of the sentence. It follows from 
this that the closer the sentence is to the maximum penalty allowed by the 
offense statute, the more detailed the reasons given in writing must be.104 
Appellate court (and Federal Court of Justice) decisions over recent decades 
have significantly widened review of sentencing decisions on legal grounds.105 
Although sentencing once was considered to be fully at the discretion of the 
trial judge, today a sentencing decision is considered to be, in its essential parts, 
the application of law. 
The design of this approach caters to the essential need to generate belief in 
the fairness or justice of criminal punishment. Individualization of criminal 
punishment may be seen as being just because its consequences result in each 
offender being judged on the basis of his or her uniqueness. But 
individualization is not compatible with the maxim “treat like cases alike”106 
because like cases are difficult to imagine if each offender (and the related 
criminal offense) is unique. 
The German system of sentencing therefore is designed not to respond to 
external influences but to increase incentives to stay in line with past sentencing 
decisions and resulting patterns, and to drastically reduce opportunities to 
deviate from established sentencing patterns. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The German system of sentencing is based on a deeply entrenched 
mechanism of learning and transmitting established sentencing patterns. This 
mechanism performs the same functions as sentencing guidelines or sentencing 
councils, but is more effective in sustaining stable and predictable sentencing 
patterns through 
(1) self-control and commitment generated within the judiciary itself, and 
(2) a comparative and empirical approach to assessing cases that separates making a 
sentencing decision from reasoning about a sentencing decision. 
Both levels are important, though. The comparative and empirical approach 
allows for learning, professional socialization, and the formation of collective 
knowledge about where to place “typical cases.” The level of normative 
reasoning and development of legal doctrine on sentencing serve to satisfy the 
demand for individualized sentencing and—due to elaborated statutory duties 
 
 103.  BGH Feb 27, 1992, 1992, 12 NSTZ 381. 
 104.  BGH October 22, 2002, 2003, 8 NSTZ-RR 52. 
 105.  RAINER HAMM, DIE REVISION IN STRAFSACHEN 543 (7th ed. 2010). 
 106.  MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 186 (1996). 
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to justify sentencing in writing—as a permanently available reservoir of 
mistakes in law that allow for interventions by appellate courts. 
The normative framework supports this system of self-control by providing 
a second track of measures of security that facilitate commitments to guilt and 
relieve the first track of pressures to consider risk and security that would not 
be compatible with learning routines, values, and sentencing discourses 
developed and transmitted in the judicial system. 
 
